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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--

-- -- - - - - -

LORNA M. ALDER SOFFE, aka
LORNA M. ALDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
-vs-

Case No. 17342

DONALD BLAINE RIDD and
NANCY M. RIDD, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

-

- - -- - -- - - -- --- - - -

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant (vendor) to retake a home
and real property and to terminate a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the
sale of said home and real property, and a Counterclaim by defendantsrespondents for the return of monies paid by defendants-respondents to
plaintiff-appellant on said Uniform Real Estate Contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff-appellant's Complaint was dismissed, no cause of action,
and defendants-respondents were granted judgment on their Counterclaim in
the sum of $15,897.19.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of the judgment of the lower court, wherein defendants-
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respondents were granted judgment against plaintiff-appellant on their
Counterclaim and remanded with directions to the lower court to dismiss
defendants-respondents Counterclaim, and that plaintiff-appellant be
awarded attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 10th day of March, 1978, defendants-respondento,
pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract (plaintiff-appellant's Exhibit
agreed to purchase, and plaintiff-appellant agreed to sell a home and
approximately .70 acre of real property at 1341 East Creek Road, Sandy,
Utah, as described by said Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The total pur-

chase price of said home and real property was $57,500.00, payable $16,500.8:·
down, $325.00 per month, and $10,250.00 on the 10th day of March of each
year thereafter on the principal, with interest at 9-1/2% per annum.
Defendants-respondents moved into the home and paid $325.00 per
month through April, 1979.

Defendants-respondents failed to pay the

$10,250.00 payment due March 10, 1979, and failed to pay further monthly
payments; and on the 18th day of April, 1979, plaintiff-appellant had
served on defendants-respondents a Notice of Default (R. 8-10).

On April

1979, plaintiff-appellant had served upon defendants-respondents a notice
terminating the contract (R. 10-11).

This action was commenced to remove

defendants-respondents from the home and to terminate the Uniform Real
Estate Contract, and defendants-respondents on or about the 22nd day of
June, 1979, moved from the home.

Plaintiff-appellant thereafter entered

upon the premises and did certain repair work as hereinafter set forth
(Exhibits 4-P, 5-P, 6-P, and 7-P).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 3 -

The home on the property was fairly old, and pursuant to defendantsrespondents' counsel, Mra Harrison 1 s, testimony, the home was in some

disrepair, had outbuildings, including chicken coops and garage, and an
orchard, etc. (Tr. 180: 1-30).
Plaintiff-appellant testified and presented exhibits as to her cost
factors by way of the sale to defendants-respondents and as to repairs,
maintenance, utility bills, and anticipated costs of resale, which were as
follows:

Title insurance policy $259.00 (Exhibit 2-P

taxes $537.15 (Exhibit 3-P

Tr. 136: 23-28);

Tr. 137: 5-9); list of expenses including checks

written for linoleum repairs $150.00; carpet labor and materials $1,020.47;
painting $1,165.00; draperies $296.31; carpentry work $330.57; electrical
materials $48.65; plumbing expense $65.00; miscellaneous $9.11; sewer unpaid
by defendants-respondents $5.28; replacement of shrubs $204.36; payment to a

cleaner $100.00; mileage $79.00; labor by plaintiff-appellant and her husband
$4,953.75; insurance $73.00 (Exhibit 4-P).

In addition, time records of

plaintiff-appellant and defendants-respondents were admitted (Exhibit 7-P).
In addition to the above, plaintiff-appellant testified that she
had not sold the home (Tr. 147: 16-19), and in fact still has not been able
to sell the home as of this date.

Plaintiff-appellant testified that the

sum of $400.00 to $450.00 would be a reasonable rental value, and based on
$400.00 per month for twenty-five months, said time from the date of contract
until the time of trial would total $10,000.00 (Tr. 175: 3-8); and defendantsrespondents' expert witness, Mark B. Stevens, a brother in law of defendantrespondent Nancy M. Ridd, testified as an expert that $325.00 was a
<••sonable rental value (Tr. 214: 12-14).

The court allowed $325.00 per
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month for fifteen months.

Both plaintiff-appellant and defendant-responden'.

Donald Blaine Ridd acknowledged that in their opinion the home was worth
$50,000.00 in June,

1979, when defendants-respondents left the home, a loss

of bargain of $7,500.00 (Tr. 199: 5-9).

There was also testimony by plainti:-.

appellant that a real estate commission to sel 1 the home would be 6'C or
$3,450.00, and that a new title policy would cost $259.00.

Plaintiff-

appellant's counsel testified as to his costs and attorney fees, includi~
the trial,

totalling $3,982.30 (Tr.

176: 6-13).

The total an,ount of

plaintiff-appellant's loss, without including any interest factor or without
knowing when the home would be sold, totalled $34,487.95, pursuant to
plaintiff-appellant's testimony.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN AWARDING DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT IN THE SUM OF $15,897.19 ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM.
The court found that defendants-respondents had paid on the home
the sum of $20,725.00 total, said sum being $16,500.00 downpayment and
$325.00 per month for thirteen months, the $325.00 just covering the interest
payment, and defendants-respondents were to pay the contract out in four
years, with a minimum principal payment each year of $10,250.00.

The court

further found that there was a valid contract for the sale and purchase of'
home and real property, and that the home, irrespective of the .70 acre, had
a reasonable rental value of $325.00 per month, a total of $4,983.22, and
that plaintiff-appellant's only loss was title insurance $259.00, sewer
charge $5.28, cleaning $100.00, labor of plaintiff-appellant and her husband
$375.00, insurance on the fence kept by defendants-respondents $100.00, and
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fire insurance $73.00, for a total of $912.28, or a total of $5,895.50
which the court deducted from the total payments made by defendantsreopondents, and awarded judgment to defendants-respondents on their Counterclaim of $14,829.50 plus 6% interest from the date defendants-respondents
moved from the home on June 22, 1979, a total of $15,897.19.

I am not sure

why the court did not give the defaulting party a purple heart and a blue
ribbon.
The court did not consider certain items which by the contract
itself were applicable, to-wit:

The defendants-respondents, pursuant to

paragraph 12, had agreed to pay taxes, and the court did not even award
plaintiff-appellant any portion of the taxes she paid for the year 1979 in
the sum of $537.15.

The contract also provides the defaulting party pay

reasonable attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 21 of said Uniform Real
Estate Contract, (and the court found the defendants-respondents defaulted
on said contract), and testimony was given at trial by plaintiff-appellant's
counsel as to $3,982.30 in attorney fees, and the court
fees.

allowed~

attorney

In addition thereto, the court ignored the loss of bargain which both

plaintiff-appellant and defendants-respondents had testified was $7,500.00,
as well as ignored the fact that said home had to be resold, and that real
estate conunissions would need to be paid, as well as new title insurance,
and refused to consider the fact that the home had not sold and was still
vacant on the 12th day of April, 1980, and by the way, said home has still
not been sold.

Also the court did not consider the repairs and expenditures

in placing said home in condition for resale, including the time the plaintiff-
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appellant spent, and the court ignored the forfeiture provision of the
contract, decided to remake the contract itself, and declared the terminatior.
and forfeiture of the contract was unconscionable and created a totally
unconscionable contract as to plaintiff-appellant.
In Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 478-9, 243 P.2d 446, 451-2
(1952), the Utah Supreme Court opened a can of worms, in that it has allowed
trial courts to place their decision as to what is "unconscionable" and to
ignore a contract as written, and to rewrite the contract as each trial court

may determine as to what amount of money is a shock to its conscience.

ISee

alsc Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 ( 1954) and Peck v. Judd,
7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712 (1958).)
The trial courts and Utah Supreme Court have set forth in the above
cases and others as well, as in Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 Utah (1977J.
the following factors to be considered as to said forfeiture:

"l.

Loss of an advantageous bargain;

"2.

Any damage to er depreciation of the property;

"3.

Any decline in value due to change in market value of the
property not allowed in items 1 and 2;

"4.

For the fair rental value during the period of occupancy."

In the case of Johnson v. Carman, the court also found that interest
on the balance due on said contract, as well as attorney fees, were also
applicable damages to be considered, as well as other factors.
The problem arises in regard to the court placing its decision as
to what is or what is not unconscionable,

in that as in this particular case

before the court, the home was an older home with acreage, to-wit:
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approximately .70 acre, outbuildings and orchard, etc., that the property hcd
not been resold, that the property was worth now $50,000.00, the downpayment
and monthly payments have been spent by seller, she has not received any
undue enrichment, does not have her advantage of receiving $325.00 per
month and $10,250.00 per year.

Yet defendants-respondents have a judgment

against plaintiff-appellant at this point in excess of $16,000.00, which I
suppose they can now execute upon, have the property sold at sheriff's sale,
and in the event plaintiff-appellant cannot pay said judgment, defendantsrespondents would own the same property by reason of their execution on
their judgment and would then have good title to the property without the
payment of the balance due on the contract plus interest.
Each day in the state of Utah there are buyers and sellers of
homes and other properties by the use cf the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
This is especially true with the present high interest rates.

In that regard

by way of argument, if a purchase is made of one hundred acres at $10,000.00
per acre, and of the $1,000,000.0C purchase price $200,000.00 is paid down
and the balance is to be paid at $100,000.00 per year, with the idea and
hope that the property can be sold in one year for $2,000,000.00, and said
property having no buildings upon it and used only for grazing has a reasonable rental value of $400.00 per year.

A buyer can then come back to the

court, and if we use the rationale of the trial court in this specific case,
the seller's only damage is $400.00 for reasonable rental value, and when a
default occurs and the contract is breached, one can request that the court
return $199,600.00 of the downpayment.
In no other arrangements for the sale of real property is this
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true.

In the event a trust deed is used on a home for $S ,000.00, and the

home is worth $100,000.00, and the owner of the trust deed bids in the
home at $S,OOO.OO, the court or no other governmental function protects the
owner from the loss of $9S,OOO.OO, and the same is true of mortgages.
In the case referred to above, Johnson v. Carman, Chief Justice
Ellett in dissenting in that case, which dissent was joined by Justice
Crockett, Chief Justice Ellett states as follows:
"This case is not in equity to foreclose the interests of
the purchaser. This is a law action for money had and
received. To permit this sort of a case tc be considered
is to encourage a purchaser to hold an interest in land
and if the value thereof does not increase, to breach his
agreement to pay, move out, and then sue for a return of
his money. See the following cases which are in point:
Glock v. Howard and Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, SS P.
713 (1898); Skookumv. Thomas, 162 Cal. S39, 123 P. 363
Cal. ( 1912); Jackson v. Peddycoart, 98 Okl, 198, 224 P.
689 (1924).
"The law does not permit one to take advantage of his own
wrong or default. It is well settled by this court and
other courts of the highest standing that the vendee in an
executory contract for the purchase of lands, who, after
paying part of the consideration under such contract, makes
default and refuses to carry out the further terms agreed
upon, cannot maintain an action to recover any of the consideration advanced. Helm v. Rone, 43 Okl. 137, 141 P. 678;
Snyder v. Johnson, 44 Okl. 388, 144 P. 1035; Hurley v. Anicker,
51 Okl. 97, lSl P. S93. From the authorities cited it is
clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the money
paid, or to have affirmative relief as to the note and mortgage, unless the defendant's answer may be considered such a
rescission on his part as would entitle the plaintiff to
recover."

In ~ummary of Utah Real Property Law, Volume 1, Chapter 9, BYU
Legal Studies (1978), there is an extended discussion about the forfeituu
provision, commencing on page 303-306.
The basic problem of the court placing itself as the conscience
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bearer of a defaulting party who created the wrong, is that a contracting
party can never be sure as to whether or not if he sells on a Uniform Real
ist•t• Contract, that he may end up being required to return the money of a
defaulting party, even though the seller no longer has the monry to return.
That also leads to the question of what is unconscionable.

In

Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963), the court determined
that a buyer who had purchased a piece of property for $41,500.00, made
payments of $19,000.00, and had spent $9,500.00 on repairs, was not
unconscionable and allowed the forfeiture.
In the case before the court, a sale for $57,500.00 wherein
$20,725.00 had been paid, was determined to be unconscionable, and the
court ignored the fact that plaintiff-appellant had expended considerable
sums by way of repairs, and the court did not allow plaintiff-appellant
normal damages as allowed by this court in numerous cases, including taxes,
interest on unpaid balance, loss of bargain, title insurance, future cost
of sale, attorney fees, etc., and awarded the defaulting party $15,897.19
plus 8% interest from the total amount received of $20,725.00, after over
fifteen months of occupying the property.

The court would not have returned

to seller any sums if the buyer had sold the property after fifteen months
for $157,000.00, then why should the reverse be true?
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the District
Court should be reversed, and the action remanded with instructions to
dismiss defendants-respondents Counterclaim, and grant plaintiff attorney
fees.

Respectfully submitted,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
NOLAN J. OLSEN
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

